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I. INTRODUCTION
Even measuring the Brown v. Board of Education decisions1 by the
most modest standard is to acknowledge a dream not realized. While
Brown represented, most unequivocally, a blow to segregation in public
schools, some fifty years later, many public schools have become racially
identifiable again. Today, 37% of African-Americans and Latinos attend
schools which are overwhelmingly comprised of minorities.' In Detroit,
80% of the White students attend schools with only 3% African-Ameri-
can; 80% of African-Americans attend schools which are only 4% of
White.' In Texas, 40% of its 1.8 million students attend "overwhelm-
ingly" Hispanic schools. 4 In Cleveland, over half of all African-American
students attended racially isolated schools in the 1970's and 1980's.5 In
2001, that number actually rose to over 65%.6
Prior to Brown, the education gap between Whites and African-Ameri-
cans was overwhelming. In 1950, 6.5% of America's nonwhite population
had no formal education, 24.9% had completed less than five years of
schooling, and over 31% were functionally illiterate.7 Contrast that with
Whites in 1950: only 2.1% had no formal education, only 6.6% had com-
pleted less than five years of schooling, and only 8.7% could be consid-
ered functionally illiterate. Today, these disparities have narrowed, but
are no less distressing. According to the National Assessment of Educa-
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349
U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
2. Howard Manly, Op-Ed., Brown's Forsaken Dreams: Flawed Rulings of 1954 Color
Today's School, BOSTON HERALD, May 16, 2004, at 027 (disclosing that between 90-100%
of the students in these schools are minorities).
3. Ron French, Brad Heath & Christine MacDonald, Metro Classes Remain Separate,
Often Unequal: Gaps Persist in Resources, Achievement, DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2004, at
1A, available at http:detnews.com2004/specialreport/0405/17/aOl-153972.htm (discussing
Brown's success in striking the policy of a "separate but equal" school education system,
but also Brown's failure to integrate blacks and whites in the public school system); see also
Scott Stephens, Pioneering District at a Crossroads, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
May 17, 2004, at Al (reporting that even in Charlotte-once a bright example of desegre-
gation efforts-there has been marked re-segregation, with thirty-three percent of its
schools predominately one-race).
4. Jennifer LaFleur, Many Areas of Texas Dominated by One Ethnicity, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 17, 2004.
5. Scott Stephens, Pioneering District at a Crossroads, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), May 17, 2004, at Al.
6. Scott Stephens & Dave Davies, 66% of Cleveland Minorities Attend Racially Iso-
lated Schools, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), May 16, 2004, at Al.
7. Carol L. Miller, The Relative Educational Attainment of the Negro Population in the
United States, 22 J. NEGRO EDUC. 388, 389 (1953). Miller does not define "nonwhite," but
states that of the numbers associated with nonwhites, the majority "are Negroes." Id. at
390.
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tional Progress, in 2003, 65% of African-Americans in K-12 were unable
to read at that their grade level, compared to 25% of Whites.8 Over 15%
of African-Americans could not read proficiently upon leaving high
school.9 Furthermore, only 50.2% African-Americans graduated from
high school in four years, versus 74.9% of Whites.1" African-American
college enrollment and completion rates are similarly low. African-
Americans earn only 50% of the college degrees that Whites earn. It is
no mystery that educational outcomes have a significant, if not dispositive
impact on earning power and sustained economic prosperity. Thus, it
should come as little surprise that African-American wage earnings are
only 67% of those earned by Whites.11
Before Brown, it was presumed that the primary cause for then-ex-
isting achievement gaps and the racial identity of public schools was the
system of de jure segregation which relegated African-American children
to inferior educational resources, high classroom populations, and racial
isolation. It was the Brown litigation that brought those problems into
relief, including the psychological damage caused by de jure segregation
and its pernicious impact on academic achievement. The promise abided
that public school desegregation would ensure equal, thus better educa-
tional opportunities for African-Americans. However, given the current
racial make-up of public urban schools, and the persistent achievement
gaps, many view the promise of Brown woefully unfulfilled.
It might be said that Brown was supposed to do two things: 1) provide
immediate relief to the litigants and the school districts, and 2) provide a
directive steeped in constitutional doctrine to eliminate all vestiges of
segregation and discrimination in not only those schools directly involved
in the litigation, but public school systems nationwide.12 However, it
quickly became clear that Brown could not "simply" be about school seg-
regation and discrimination. To be an unmitigated success, Brown would
have to address the segregation and discrimination that infected virtually
every aspect of our country.
Brown could never do that. For all of Brown's potential, it was simply
incapable of addressing the myriad social, political, and economic forces
8. George Archibald, 50 Years Later, Brown Disappoints, WASH. TIMES, May 17,
2004, at Al, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/nationaU20040517-124748-6802r.
htm.
9. Id.
10. CHRISTOPHER B. SWANSON, PROJECTIONS OF 2003-2004 HIGH SCHOOL GRADU-
ATES 11-12 (Urban Institute Education Policy Center), http//:www.urban.org/Uploaded
PDF/411009_2003_04_HSgraduates.pdf.
11. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, FIRST QUARTER (2005) (reporting the statistics
for the sixteen year old and over population only).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
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that profoundly impacted the decision itself, and equally as important,
would frustrate the desegregation remedies prescribed. As the late Roy
Wilkins described, the states "insisted and wove into a smothering pattern
a thousand different personal humiliations, both public and private, based
upon color." 3 The purpose of this Article is to illuminate how the Brown
decisions-flawed in themselves-had to overcome that "smothering pat-
tern" of racism and discrimination in areas beyond the courts' equitable
and temporal reach. In sum, Brown proved to be no match for rank ra-
cism, unchecked political power, judicial capitulation, housing segrega-
tion and even interstate highway construction policies.
Part One of this Article examines the Brown decisions and the after-
math. Part Two revisits the desegregation saga post-Green v. County
School Board of New Kent County, Virginia,4 and the subsequent politi-
cal and judicial forces which would doom desegregation efforts. Part
Three examines the role that suburbanization and interstate highway
transportation policies contributed to the frustration of desegregation ef-
forts. This Article concludes by positing that in the context of modern
public school reform, the promise of Brown is still elusive due to pro-
posed legislative solutions, which once again, marginalize the interests of
African-Americans.
II. WHAT BROWN DID NOT DO
A. Brown I as a Triumph of Racial Restorative Justice? Well, Not
Quite
Certainly, there has been plenty of justifiable praise for Brown's im-
pact. It has been described in almost mythic terms, noted as "a defining
moment in American history,"' 5 and is credited for the growth of the
black middle class.16 Many more, however, have cast sobering eyes to-
13. NATHANIEL R. JONES, A PERSONAL REFLECTION ON THE IMPORTANCE AND
MEANING OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION IN BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 96 (2004). The late Roy Wilkins starkly described the state of our nation
before Brown: "Through legal and extra-legal machinery, through unchallenged political
power, and through economic sanctions, a code of demeaning conduct was enforced and
cast down on children, before they could dream, and eroded manhood after they came of
age." Id.
14. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
15. SYMPoSIUM, Fifty Years After Brown v. Board: Five Principles for Moving Ahead,
6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y REP. 242 (2004); SYMPOSIUM, Fifty Years After Brown v. Board:
Five Principles for Moving Ahead, 11 ASIAN L.J. 324 (2004); SYMPosIUM, Fifty Years After
Brown v. Board: Five Principles for Moving Ahead, 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 115
(2004); SYMPoSIuM, Fifty Years After Brown v. Board: Five Principles for Moving Ahead,
19 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 443 (2004).
16. Constance Baker Motley, Reflections on Justice Before and After Brown, 32 FORD-
HAM URBAN L.J. 101, 108 (2004) ("Yet the Supreme Court's decision half a century ago
[Vol. 9:187
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ward its legacy. Derrick Bell has remarked upon Brown's "unassertive
and finally failed implementation" because it did not boldly rebuke the
likelihood that Whites were only going to abide by desegregation reme-
dies that converged with their interests, if at all. 17 In a similar vein,
Charles Ogletree observed that the Brown H's "with all deliberate speed"
directive was a bow to White resistance to desegregation and ensured
that Brown would never be "implemented as a social imperative. '"18 Pro-
fessor Lani Guinier, reflecting upon Brown, noted that the decision al-
lowed to continue, "uninterrupted," White America's compulsion to use
race as a scapegoat, which ultimately led to our re-stigmatization. 9 Gary
Orfield commented that the Brown holding would have been
remembered as a failure, but for the civil rights movement.2z Still others
have placed the current racial disparities in academic achievement, as
well as the re-segregation of public school systems throughout the coun-
try, squarely on the shoulders of African-Americans."
Questions and recriminations surrounding Brown's impact have by no
means been isolated to ivory towers. Brown has been re-evaluated in
churches, classrooms, the basketball courts, barbershops, and street cor-
ners. In those discussions, there is little need to cite statistics on academic
achievement, racial disparities, or re-segregative patterns. On a daily ba-
sis, those people bear witness to the failed academic achievements of
their sons, daughters, and neighbors' children, despite their best efforts.
They watch their children board buses, on a milk route to a dilapidated
has generated a black middle class by opening higher education to African-Americans, and
has demonstrated that the law can align itself with rather than merely enforcing the predi-
lections of majority rule-makers.").
17. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 196 (2004) (stating also that the language of
the opinion "lifted the spirits of blacks" and "led to public support and congressional ac-
tion that might not otherwise have occurred for some time").
18. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 306 (2004).
19. Interview by Tavis Smiley with Lani Guinier, Harvard Professor (May 10, 2004)
("Brown essentially allowed that understanding to continue uninterrupted. So you had
enormous white backlash to Brown because many poor working-class whites saw Brown
and saw desegregation as downward economic mobility ....").
20. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996).
21. See, e.g., JOHN H. MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK
AMERICA 3, 83 (2000) (arguing that African-Americans do not do poorly in school because
of racism, but instead have "a virus of [a]nti-intellectualism that infects the black commu-
nity," by adopting and exaggerating victimhood as identity); RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN &
CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERI-
CAN LIFE (1994) (examining the role of heredity ethnic and racial groups differences in
intelligence).
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school across town into an overcrowded classroom with outdated re-
sources and overworked teachers. Their daily life experiences tell them
all they need to know: something just is not right. Given the moral and
legal triumph that Brown represented, our lives, and the educational op-
portunities for our children, should be much better.
So what happened? Without doubt, the Brown decision was a triumph
in restorative justice, offering all African-Americans a vindication of
sorts. The opinion acknowledged what we at the time knew all along:
that "separate" was never "equal," but always "less;" and that "separate"
was never anything more than a racist construct expressly designed and
maintained to stamp African-Americans with an indelible badge of inferi-
ority. With the Brown decisions, this particular Jim Crow doctrine had
finally been exposed as the most opprobrious, fallacious paradigm ever
enforced in a society that considered itself civilized. That no less an au-
thority than the Supreme Court had finally determined that African-
Americans children deserved nothing short of an education equal to that
afforded white children was reason to rejoice. The Brown decision pro-
vided hope for something that could never, ever, be obtained under a de
jure segregated system.
The crime of racism and its various incarnations have been well-
demonstrated, but atonement by the perpetrators had been long in com-
ing. Even the Emancipation Proclamation failed to vanquish all the tools
employed to commit the crime (the shackle, the bit, the whip, the pyre,
the noose, the law), as we would witness with the invigoration of the Ku
Klux Klan and Jim Crow laws. As Plessy v. Ferguson22 infamously sanc-
tioned continued use of those laws (and outlaws) for another fifty years,
the Brown decision represented justice long denied for African-
Americans.
Unanimously rebuking the Plessy "separate but equal" doctrine, the
Brown I court, in six words-"[s]eparate educational facilities are inher-
ently unequal"-overruled half a century of a sorry legacy.23 By ruling
that separate public accommodations in K-12 education were "obnoxious
to the fourteenth amendment,, 24 the Supreme Court in Brown I finally
did what it hinted toward sixteen years before. 21 Until 1954, if any Su-
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I).
24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) ("[W]e cannot say that a law
which authorizes or even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is
unreasonable ....").
25. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding a state must provide compa-
rable facilities for legal education for African-Americans where they have such facilities
for Whites); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (finding that a
state institution could not deny admission to an applicant based solely upon the applicant's
[Vol. 9:187
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preme Court decision could fairly be characterized as a bombshell to the
wall of segregation, the Brown I opinion was indeed that-one which
blew segregation's resilient bricks out of their mortar.26
Invoking the metaphor of war is apt. As widely acknowledged, the
Brown decision was in part a response to circumstances beyond the
schoolhouse: the defeat of Nazism and Communism.27 For the United
States, "segregation posed a contradiction for the self-proclaimed exem-
plar of freedom and democracy."28 On the heels of a World War II vic-
tory, and in the throes of a still-existing Communist threat, the Supreme
Court-indeed our entire country-was confronting a shameful moral
contradiction: how was it that we could fight on behalf of others to live
free from oppressive regimes while America continued to confer no
rights to African-Americans that were equally obvious.2 9 The impor-
tance of moral consistency in the global context was not lost on President
Truman, or the Supreme Court.3 ° That argument proved to be a power-
ful weapon in Thurgood Marshall's rhetorical arsenal. Through the
Brown I opinion, political leaders were able to claim a degree of moral
superiority that had previously criticized the discriminatory practices per-
mitted in the United States.3'
When viewed in this light, one can see how Brown I was not an uncom-
promised moral triumph. The decision raised the distressing notion that,
to banish Jim Crow from public education, it would be insufficient to
solely rely upon the inherent immorality of racial segregation and discrim-
race); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (reversing
the lower court and holding that an institution of higher learning which creates seating
assignments based upon race in the classroom, library and cafeteria deprives the plaintiff of
his right to equal protection of the laws); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding
that the "educational opportunities offered [to] white and Negro law students ... were not
substantially equal").
26. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 21-28 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court
should have upheld Plessy and, alternatively, directed districts to ensure that schools were
equally resourced).
27. Id. at 59.
28. Id. at 60.
29. See Plessy, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
30. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 75 S. Ct. 753
(1952); (Nos. 8, 101,191, 413, 448) DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 66 (2004).
31. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 66-67 (2004) (quoting President Truman
pleading that "if we wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the remaining
imperfections in our practice of democracy"). "In addition, the Supreme Court was
acutely aware of the nation's need to protect its national security against those who would
exploit our internal difficulties for the benefit of external forces." Id.
2007]
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ination. Desegregation required an appeal to the nationalistic interests of
those in power to achieve justice for African-Americans.32 Cynically, it
makes one wonder whether we should be grateful that there were some
Whites who hated communism slightly more than they hated the idea of
integration.
B. Brown II as a Triumph of Racial Restorative Justice? Absolutely
Not
"What one hand giveth, the other hand taketh away."
-Proverb
Overruling Plessy was just the beginning of the end of de jure segrega-
tion in public education. The questions next became: How were the gov-
ernmental entities-school districts, state and local bodies-going to go
about eliminating the dual systems of education? What did it mean to
"desegregate?" And when would desegregation have to occur? A year
after its Brown I decision, the Supreme Court gave its "wholly unasser-
tive" reply in Brown II.
In doing so, what the Supreme Court gave in Brown I, it took away in
Brown II. Yielding to a fear of massive white resistance, the Supreme
Court softened the potential impact of its Brown I pronouncement with a
phrase that would have a devastating impact. The Court cited the need to
give weight to "public and private considerations," and the "elimination
of a variety of obstacles" to implement its desegregation order.33 The
elimination of those obstacles "in a systematic and effective manner" re-
quired taking "into account the public interest[.] '34 Consequently, the
Supreme Court blinked, directing school boards to admit students "to
public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis" not at once, but
"with all deliberate speed.''35
32. Id. at 49 (moving the author's "interest convergence" theory through the arc of
the United States civil rights history by illuminating the point that even African-Ameri-
cans' most evil sufferings "have been insufficient, standing alone, to gain real relief from
any branch of government"). In fact, only when "policymakers perceive that such ad-
vances will further interests that are their primary concern" did African-Americans gain
civil rights advancements. Id.
33. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (Brown II), ("To effectuate this
interest [of nondiscriminatory admission into public schools] may call for elimination of a
variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with
the constitutional principles set forth in our [previous] decision .... While giving weight to
these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the [school boards]
make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our [previous] ruling.").
34. Id. ("Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the
elimination of ... obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.").
35. Id. at 301 (emphasis added) ("The judgments below ... are accordingly reversed
and remanded [to] ... enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are
[Vol. 9:187
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This textual reading of Brown H provides the persuasive premise of
Professor Ogletree's hypothesis, and confirms Professor Bell's interest-
convergence theory. The remedy prescribed in Brown II would not be
"pure," but only one that accommodated majority interests. With those
four words, Marshall and others sadly recognized which "public" Chief
Justice Warren meant when he said public interest: Whites resistant or
hostile to integration. They also knew that the "obstacles" of which War-
ren spoke were largely those de jure and de facto anti-black systems
which had been woven, by that "public," into every conceivable aspect of
American life. The greatest "obstacle," of course, was the endemic ra-
cism of white resistance that would not be cowed by judges who had
"substituted their personal political and social ideas for the established
law of the land."36 As Professor Ogletree recounts, events unfolding over
the next decade would define what Chief Justice Warren failed to articu-
late in Brown I. "[A]ll deliberate speed" meant change would come
slowly, cautiously, warily,37 and at a pace dictated by whites.3
C. "Nullification and Interposition" Throughout the South
I have a dream that one day, down in Alabama, with its vicious rac-
ists, with its governor having his lips dripping with the words of 'in-
terposition' and 'nullification'- one day right there in Alabama
little black boys and black girls will be able to join hands with little
white boys and white girls as sisters and brothers. I have a dream
today!
-Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.3 9
The Reverend Doctor Martin Luther King, Jr. saw it, and called it what
it was. The "all deliberate speed" directive amounted to a "white pass,"
necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially and nondiscriminatory basis
with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases.").
36. Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REC. 4515-16 (1956) (documenting the members
of Congress in 1956 who opposed racial integration in public places. It had ninety-six sig-
natories, all from Southern states. The Manifesto was drafted to counter the Brown
ruling).
37. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 310 (2004) (noting that the
Court's order to integrate with "all deliberate speed" has been very deliberate, but not
very speedy).
38. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1219 (1969) (quoting
Justice Black). "Unfortunately this struggle has not eliminated dual school systems, and I
am of the opinion that so long as that phrase is a relevant factor they will never be elimi-
nated. 'All deliberate speed' has turned out to be only a soft euphemism for delay." Id.
39. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Speech Delivered at the Lincoln Memo-
rial (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkihavea
dream.htm.
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enabling contrary school districts, authorities, politicians, and the courts
to effectuate Brown on their own terms-terms that denoted passive re-
sistance, delay, avoidance, obfuscation, and in too many instances, vio-
lence. This says nothing of the Brown plaintiffs' sufferings: threatened,
fired from their jobs, unable to secure loans and financing, or arrested on
spurious charges.4" To be sure, in the years following Brown H, resis-
tance to integration, famous and infamous, was legion, unfolding at a
pace and with a ferocity that-figuratively and literally-stopped hearts.
In 1955, NAACP leader Reverend George Wesley Lee of Belzoni was
murdered, as was Florida's NAACP President and his wife.41 Sixteen-
sticks of dynamite outside of his bedroom window sent the Reverend
Fred Shuttleworth through the floor and into the basement of his Bir-
mingham home on December 25, 1956; he survived this one of several
attempts to take his life.42 Within the first four years of the Brown I
decision, there were reportedly "530 cases of overt racial violence and
intimidation - including 6 murders, 29 shootings, 44 beatings, 5 stabbings
and the bombings of 30 homes, 7 churches, 4 synagogues and 4 schools.
In the tense battle over desegregation, 17 southern towns were
threatened with mob violence."43 At the federal, state, and local levels,
politicians met the Supreme Court's decision with bold-faced contempt.
George Wallace's vitriolic invocation-"[S]egregation today! Segregation
40. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1977) (chronicling the history of the individ-
uals involved in the litigation leading to and including the Brown decisions).
41. B.R. Brazeal, Some Problems in the Desegregation of Higher Education in the
"Hard Core" States, 27 J. NEGRO EDUC. 352, 355, 365 (1958).
42. Fred Shuttlesworth, He Pushed Martin Luther King Jr. into Greatness, 2001 J.
BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 61, 61 (2001). At that time, Reverend Shuttlesworth was the
Chairman of the Membership Committee for the Alabama NAACP. Id.
43. John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUF-
FALO L. REV. 653, 684 (1994).
It must be noted that the Brown decisions came at the apex of the Montgomery bus
boycott, whose successes led to malevolent reprisals by the Ku Klux Klan and other
racists, and further fueled white resentment to the Brown victories. Id. "Segregation-
ist resentment expressed itself in other potentially lethal forms. Two days after the
inauguration of desegregated seating, someone fired a shotgun through the front door
of King's home. A day later, on Christmas Eve, white men attacked a black teenager
as she exited a bus. Four days after that, two buses were fired upon by snipers. In one
sniper incident, a pregnant woman was shot in both legs. Then, on January 10, 1956,
bombs destroyed five black churches and the home of Reverend Robert S. Graetz,
one of the few white Montgomerians who had publicly sided with the [Montgomery
Improvement Association]."
Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King's Constitution: A Legal History of the Montgomery
Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999, 1055 (1989).
[Vol. 9:187
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tomorrow! Segregation forever!"44 stands today as a chilly, emblematic
testament to the intense defiance. The NAACP was outlawed from oper-
ating in Alabama by a circuit court judge's order in 1956.45 One hundred
United States legislators from southern states vowed to "resist forced in-
tegration by any lawful means.",4 6 Those legislators endorsed a "South-
ern Manifesto" which decried the Supreme Court's "abuse of judicial
power."47 Governor Orval Faubus asserted that Arkansas was not bound
by Brown, posting guardsmen at the doors of Little Rock's Central High
School to prevent entry of African-American students.48 The Gray Com-
mission of Virginia was established by the governor to study methods by
which to keep the schools separate.4 9 Both Delaware and Texas legisla-
tures passed laws stating that no child could be compelled to attend a
racially mixed school,5" as did nineteen other legislatures.1
Southern anti-integrationists found their outlets to oppose Brown
through organizations such as the Mississippi White Citizens Council and
the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission, the latter whose state-sanc-
tioned charge was "to do and perform any and all acts and things deemed
necessary and proper to protect the sovereignty of the State of Missis-
sippi, and her sister states, from encroachment thereon by the federal
government or any branch, department or agency thereof[.] ' 52
44. George C. Wallace, Inaugural Address of Governor of Alabama in Montgomery,
Ala. (Jan. 14, 1963).
45. B.R. Brazeal, Some Problems in the Desegregation of Higher Education in the
"Hard Core" States, 27 J. NEGRO EDUC. 352, 353 (1958).
46. Southern Manifesto, 102 CONG. REC. 4515-16 (1956) (being sponsored by Strom
Thurmond of South Carolina, Harry Byrd of Virginia, and Richard Russell of Georgia,
stating strong opposition to forced integration). "We regard the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the school cased as a clear abuse of judicial power." Id. "With the gravest con-
cern for the explosive and dangerous condition created by this decision and inflamed by
outside meddler [,]... [w]e commend the motves of those States which have declared the
intention to resist forced integration by any lawful mean." Id.
47. Id.
48. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 753-54 (1977); Robert P. George, Lincoln on
Judicial Despotism, FIRST THINGS, Feb. 2003, at 36-40; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(rebuking Governor Faubus in holding that the Brown decisions were binding on all
states).
49. Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations: Systemic Reform of Public
Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 419, 462 (2006) (establishing a goal to
circumvent the Brown decisions by passing laws specifically devised to undermine the Su-
preme Court's decision to integrate schools).
50. The History of Jim Crow: Jim Crow Laws-Texas, http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/
scripts/jimcrow/insidesouth.cgistate=Texas (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
51. Susan Falck, Jim Crow Laws: Legislation Overview 3, http://www.jimcrowhistory.
org/resources/lessonplans/shs-esjim crow-laws.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
52. The History of Jim Crow: Jim Crow Laws-Texas, http://www.jimcrowhistory.org/
scripts/jimcrow/insidesouth.cgi?state=Texas (last visited Jan. 12, 2007).
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School boards were also defying Brown with impunity. Across the
South, districts delayed integration through "pupil placement plans," re-
quiring a school board's permission if African-American students re-
quested a transfer. Invariably, African-American students requesting
transfer were found to be "unfit," and were therefore denied." While
state administrators in Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia threatened
to close their schools if made to integrate,54 one particular district made
good on the threat. Rather than admit African-American children, edu-
cation officials in Prince Edward County, Virginia concluded that no
child-whether white, black, brown, yellow, green, blue or purple-
would be educated within its public school walls.55 The county shut down
its entire public school system for five years, during which time the state
subsidized the creation of "private" schools for Whites.56
By May 1964, southern states had enacted 450 laws and resolutions to
frustrate the Brown decision.57 It was little wonder, then, a year after Dr.
King stirred the nation's soul and conscience, only one out of fifty south-
ern African-American school-age children attended integrated schools.58
III. ONE STEP FORWARD, TEN STEPS BACK
A. Removing Vestiges Root and Branch
"Until the violation has been cured."
-Ted Shaw, NAACP
It was not until 1964 when a confluence of social, political, and legal
forces resulted in a tidal wave breaking down the barriers of continued de
jure and de facto school segregation. Beginning with the Civil Rights
Act, federal legislation became a critical tool to aid proponents of deseg-
53. ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION. CASTE, CULTURE, AND THE CONSTITUTION 190 (2003) (noting
school districts' desegregation policies and "pupil placement plans").
54. Gabriel G. Chin et al., Univ. of Ariz., Still on the Books: Jim Crow and the Segre-
gation Laws Fifty Years After Brown v. Board of Education 8-9 (Apr. 5, 2004), available at
http://law.arizona.edu/jimcrow/files/JimCrowReport.doc (revealing that in southern states,
including South Carolina and Georgia, the state governor's gave authority to schools via
legislation to close if integrated); The Brown Decision in Norfolk, Va., http://www.littlejohn
explorers.com/jeff/brown/resistance.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (stating that the school
planned to close if African-Americans seek enrollment).
55. Edward H. Peeples, Jr., Prince Edward County: The Story Without an End (July
1963) (unpublished thesis, Virginia Commonwealth University), http://www.library.vcu.
edu/jbc/speccoll/pec03a.html).
56. Id.
57. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 53 (2004).
58. BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION, The Unfinished Agenda of BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION 53 (2004).
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regation. Perhaps appropriately seen as the "backlash to the backlash,"59
one of the Act's many accomplishments was the reinvigoration of a de-
segregation movement that Brown and its judicial progeny had, until that
time, been unable to yield. A year later, the Voting Rights Act would be
passed, marking another milestone in the quest for political and legal
rights. The Fair Housing Act of 1968 sought to address what was becom-
ing the primary barrier to desegregation: housing discrimination. Fur-
ther, the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972 sought to provide financial
assistance to local school districts in developing human relations and edu-
cational initiatives. Taken together with other statutory directives and
executive orders, anti-segregation and discrimination efforts were signifi-
cantly advanced.
In addressing discrimination, Brown II made explicit what was only im-
plicit in Brown I. After Brown I first declared segregation unconstitu-
tional,6° Brown II expanded that dictate, declaring "that racial
discrimination in public education is unconstitutional., 61 Brown Ii's dic-
tate meant not "merely" integrating the schools, but identifying, then
eliminating the very touchstones, or indicia, of racial discrimination
within the public school systems.6' However, for all of the legislative mo-
mentum, it was not until 1964 that the Supreme Court reasserted itself.
Nine years after Brown II, the Supreme Court proclaimed that "[t]he
time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out."' 6 3 It was four years after
that, in Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, Virginia,'
59. Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Fabled
Desegregation Case, Not Everyone Is Celebrating, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102.
60. Susan Falck, Jim Crow Laws: Legislation Overview 3, http://www.jimcrowhis-
tory.org/resources/lessonplans/hs.esjimscrowlaws.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2007). At the
time of the Brown decision, de jure segregation did not exist nationwide. The following
states required segregation: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. See id. While in
these states segregation is permitted in varying degrees: Arizona, Kansas, New Mexico and
Wyoming. Segregation prohibited: Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Indiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Washington and Wisconsin. See id. Finally, in these states no specific legislation
regarding segregation existed: California, Maine, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont. See id. Of course,
this is not to say that those states without de jure segregation laws did not enforce other
Jim Crow laws, or enforce other segregationist measures. See id.
61. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955) (Brown II) (emphasis added).
62. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 434 (1968).
63. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964)
(describing how the ruling in Brown I was designed to ensure broader protection outside
of desegregation).
64. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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the Supreme Court ordered school districts under desegregation plans to
identify any policy or practice "traceable to the prior de jure system of
segregation" that "continue[d] to have discriminatory effects."6 5 Once
identified, remedies were now bound to address "not just... the compo-
sition of student bodies ... but ... every facet of school operations., 66
The Green decision empowered those who sought broad remedies to
eradicate the discrimination that impacted public schools and the educa-
tion of African-American children. Emboldened plaintiffs set out to
eliminate all vestiges of de jure segregation "root and branch."67
Predictably, racial discrimination impacting school segregation could
be found virtually everywhere: faculty and staff hiring; training and reten-
tion; establishing school district boundary lines; distribution of education
expenditures; student discipline; special education placement; physical
plant conditions; educational achievement and opportunities for students
in reading, math, science, communication, and other curricular funda-
mentals; vocational education placement, counseling and career gui-
dance; extra- and co-curricular activity support; school transportation;
employment; and especially in housing.68 By identifying the "hard" and
65. See United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp. 214, 218-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
("A vestige of segregation is a policy or practice which is traceable to the prior de jure
system of segregation and which continues to have discriminatory effects.").
66. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
67. Id. at 438. While many school districts outside of the South were taking voluntary
and involuntary efforts to desegregate, it was not until 1972 that the Supreme Court made
such efforts imperative for districts outside of the South. Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413
U.S. 189 (1973).
68. See, e.g., Liddell v. Missouri (Liddell Ill), 731 F.2d 1294, 1314 (8th Cir. 1984) (for a
discussion on effective school projects); Berry v. Sch. Dist. of Benton Harbor, 515 F. Supp.
344, 369 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Kelley v. Metro. County Sch. Bd., 511 F. Supp. 1363, 1368-70
(M.D. Tenn. 1981); United States v. Bd. of Comm'rs, Indianapolis Sch. Bd., 506 F. Supp.
657, 673 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Tasby v. Estes, 412 F. Supp. 1192, 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Milliken
v. Bradley (Milliken 11), 402 F. Supp. 1096, 1143-44 (E.D. Mich. 1975); United States v.
Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 30, 33-34 (E.D. Tex. 1971). See Evans v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750,
770-71 (3d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 923 (1980); Indianapolis Sch. Bd.,
506 F. Supp. at 672; Tasby, 412 F. Supp. at 1207, 1220; Milliken 11, 402 F. Supp. at 1139;
United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. 24, 33-34 (E.D. Tex. 1971) for discussions on the train-
ing institute and staff development. See Liddell 111, 731 F.2d at 1317; Milliken II, 402 F.
Supp. at 1119, 1145; Berry, 515 F. Supp. at 382-84; Indianapolis Sch. Bd., 506 F. Supp. at
673; Tasby, 412 F. Supp. at 1206, 1220-21; Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 248-49,
268-69 (D. Mass. 1975), affd, 503 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976) for a
discussion on management information system and equity compliance. See Berry, 515 F.
Supp. at 376; Tasby, 412 F. Supp. at 1219-20; United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 30;
Redman v. Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd., 293 F. Supp. 396, 380 (E.D. La. 1967); Hill v.
Lafourche Parish Sch. Bd., 291 F. Supp. 819, 823 (E.D. La. 1967) for discussions on affirm-
ative action. See Liddell III, 731 F.2d at 1310; Berry, 525 F. Supp. at 365-66; Kelley, 511 F.
Supp. at 1370; Milliken H, 402 F. Supp. at 1146-47; Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at 235, 246-47 for
discussions on magnet schools. See Tasby, 412 F. Supp. at 1217; Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at
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"soft" indicia of school segregation and discrimination, courts belatedly
began to use their equitable powers to demand broad remedies. Conse-
quently, between 1966 and 1975, 523 school districts had desegregated.6 9
Ultimately, these gains would be short-lived, as politicians, housing dis-
crimination, suburbanization, and federal interstate highway plans would
hinder efforts to achieve Brown's goals.
B. "Root and Branch": Too Little, Too Late
"Southern White Democrats will desert their party in droves the minute
it becomes a black party."
-Kevin Phillips, campaign strategist to Richard Nixon, 1967"0
As quickly as the Supreme Court stepped in to accelerate the pace of
desegregation, another backlash brewed. Particularly, the implementa-
tion of busing plans caused white citizens from Los Angeles to Boston to
violently defy desegregation orders. It was during this time that Ameri-
cans saw the image which came to symbolize the rank anti-black hatred:
attorney Theodore Landsmark, outside of Boston City Hall, being held
by a White man as another man attacks him with the spire of the pole
waving the American Flag.71
More insidiously, President Richard Nixon stepped in to hasten the re-
treat. His hostility to busing well-documented, 72 Nixon set out to chal-
lenge and stall desegregation orders, part of his overall "Southern
Strategy" for Republicans to claim-once and for all-the southern
vote. 73 He fired Leon Panetta, his Assistant Secretary of Health, Educa-
252; United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 36 for a discussion on special education or
testing. See, e.g., Milliken 11, 402 F. Supp. at 1118, 1140-41 (discussing vocational or tech-
nical education). See Evans, 582 F.2d at 771; Berry, 515 F. Supp. at 373-74; Indianapolis
School Board, 506 F. Supp. at 672; Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at 234; Milliken H, 402 F. Supp. at
1118, 1143-44; United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 30-34 for a discussion on curriculum
and instruction. See Evans, 582 F.2d at 771-72; Milliken 11, 540 F.2d at 250; Berry, 515 F.
Supp. at 379-81; Indianapolis Sch. Bd., 506 F. Supp. at 672; Tasby, 412 F. Supp. at 1219 for
a discussion of student discipline. See Milliken II, 402 F. Supp. at 1144; Tasby, 412 F. Supp.
at 1217; Morgan, 401 F. Supp. at 252; United States v. Texas, 342 F. Supp. at 30-34 for a
discussion on bilingual education. See Liddell III, 731 F.2d at 1317; United States v. Texas,
342 F. Supp. at 38 for a discussion on methods of evaluation.
69. CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN-. THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION 26 (2004).
70. Lawrence J. McAndrews, The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and School De-
segregation, 83 J. NEGRO HIST. 187, 188 (1998).
71. CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION 306 (2004) (using photogra-
phy by Stanley Forman from 1977).
72. Lawrence J. McAndrews, The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and School De-
segregation, 83 J. NEGRO HIST. 187, 188 (1998).
73. Id. at 188.
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tion, and Welfare, for his aggressive pursuit of desegregation. 4 In Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School District,75 Attorney General John
Mitchell explained that the Nixon Administration "supported Charlotte
in principle, in that we are taking the position that the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require racial integration as a matter of law. ' 76 Af-
ter the Swann decision, which ordered a busing desegregation remedy,
Nixon signed legislation stopping all busing until all appeals had been
filed, or the appeal times had lapsed.77
Nixon then trained his eye upon Supreme Court appointments. In ad-
dition to his appointment of Harry Blackmun and William Rehnquist,
Nixon also appointed Lewis Powell, Jr. to the Supreme Court with the
expressed hope that he would be instrumental in "eliminat[ing] busing
and decelerat[ing] housing desegregation efforts. ' 78 Powell did not disap-
point; his presence on the high court proved pivotal in two of the most
devastating anti-desegregation decisions ever issued. Powell's vote was
dispositive in the Milliken v. Bradley79 decision, which held that an inter-
district, urban-suburban Detroit, Michigan busing remedy to achieve ra-
cial balance was unconstitutional.8 " The Supreme Court's rejection of ur-
ban-suburban remedies ensured that Detroit and other metropolitan
school districts-especially in northern cities-could only watch helpless as
the districts tipped toward minority-majority composition. Milliken also
ensured that it would be only a matter of time when northern school dis-
tricts would throw up their hands and argue the impossibility of Brown,
and for the release from desegregation orders.
In another decision, San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez,8 Powell wrote for the 5-4 majority, reversing the district court find-
ing that Texas' property tax-school funding mechanism violated the Equal
Protection Clause.82 Holding that there was neither a constitutional right
to a public education nor financial equalization,83 it would take twenty
74. Id.
75. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
76. Lawrence J. McAndrews, The Politics of Principle: Richard Nixon and School De-
segregation, 83 J. NEGRO HIST. 187, 190 (1998)
77. Id. at 191.
78. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 27 (1996).
79. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (Milliken II).
80. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 752-53.
81. 411 U.S. 1 (1979).
82. Id. at 8.
83. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 11-12 (1996).
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years and two more iterations of school finance litigation to only partly
nullify Rodriguez's impact.
Ronald Reagan continued the assault on desegregation started by
Nixon to solidify the white southern Democratic base. After refusing an
invitation to speak before the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People at its annual convention, Reagan instead went to Phil-
adelphia, Mississippi-the town made infamous by the murders of Good-
man, Cheney, and Schwerner at the height of the civil rights movement-
to kick off his presidential campaign, and extol the virtues of "state's
rights."'  In 1981, he rescinded the Emergency School Aid Act, which
had documented success at supporting desegregation remedies, and at-
tempted to eliminate Desegregation Assistance Centers.8 5 The head of
his Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, William Reynolds,86 also
hostile towards school desegregation and busing, set about dismantling
those efforts.87 Finally, it was Reagan's Supreme Court appointees, Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, and Scalia, and Bush's appointment of Thomas who en-
sured the end of all court-ordered desegregation plans owed to the
Brown decisions.8 8
As the causal connection between de jure segregation and present ves-
tiges became more attenuated, the increasingly conservative Supreme
Court would begin to ensure that court-ordered desegregation-regard-
less of successes or failures-would come to a halt. In Missouri v. Jen-
kins, 9 the Supreme Court set time limits on equalizing funding. Freeman
v. Pitts9' limited equitable remedies, and held that districts would not
have to show correction of all violations as a condition of finding unitary
status.9 1 Finally, in Oklahoma v. Dowell,9" even though the Oklahoma
City School District had not met all of the goals set out in the desegrega-
84. JACK W. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, BLUE SMOKE & MIRRORS: HOW REA-
GAN WON & WHY CARTER LOST THE ELECTION OF 1980 (1981). Reagan's August 3, 1980
speech was delivered almost to the day on what would be the sixteenth anniversary of the
day on which the bodies of Goodman, Cheney, and Schwerner were found. Id.
85. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 16 (1996). Although Reagan did not
succeed in the latter, Congress did reduce funding of such centers, resulting in a seventy-
five percent decrease in the number of centers during Reagan's term. Id. at 17.
86. Reynolds later became Assistant Solicitor General under Reagan.
87. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 17 (1996).
88. Id. at 27.
89. 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (holding that requiring continuation and increased funding of
remedial education programs is beyond the power of the federal courts).
90. 503 U.S. 467 (1992) (discussing the remedies available to alleviate segregation in
public schools).
91. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 27 (1996).
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tion order, the Supreme Court affirmed the dissolution of the desegrega-
tion order. The school board promptly voted to return to segregated
neighborhood schools. With this, "the Supreme Court exhumed some of
Plessy's basic assumptions,"93 viz., segregated schools would be a reality
again, but with no assurance that they would be equal.
IV. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION, SUBURBANIZATION AND THE GREAT
AMERICAN HIGHWAY
A. Housing Discrimination as a Barrier to School Integration
"'You might have the cash, but you can.., not cash in your face[;]
we don't want you livin' in here!!"
-Stevie Wonder94
Without argument, housing discrimination played a fatal role in
Brown's undoing. The McMichael's Appraising Manual, originating in
the early 1930's, was the leading residential appraisal guide for decades.
The manual provided the blueprint upon which housing discrimination









8. Czechs or Bohemians
9. North Italians
10. English, Germans, Scotch, Irish, and Scandinavians95
Real estate appraisers used this manual, and its odious gauge of racial
worth, at least into the 1950'S.96 The manual's impact began taking shape
in 1933 when it was adopted by President Roosevelt's Homeowners Loan
92. 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991) (holding that desegregation orders do not operate in
perpetuity).
93. GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN E. EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET
REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 27 (1996).
94. STEVIE WONDER, Cash in Your Face, on HOTrER THAN JULY (Jobete Music/Black
Bull Music, Motown 1980).
95. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and
Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
617, 622 n.35 (1999) (noting that the list purported to rank ethnic groups according to their'
effect on property values).
96. Id. (citing MCMICHAEL'S APPRAISING MANUAL 160 (1951)).
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Corporation program to provide homeowner financial assistance during
the Great Depression. Two governmental engines that drove housing fi-
nance development over the next sixty years further institutionalized and
perpetuated racist housing practices. The Federal Housing Administra-
tion (the FHA), established in 1934, financed surburbanization beyond
World War II. Along with the Veteran's Administration (established in
1944), the FHA sought to encourage lenders to invest in residential lend-
ing through the provision of insurance.97 Their underwriting guidelines
were cribbed directly from the McMichael's manual, directing "that
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial
classes," '98 and warned against introducing "inharmonious racial groups"
into neighborhoods.99
It was not until 1950 that the FHA officially altered this policy. How-
ever, it still "recommended suitable restrictive covenants."1 ° This was so
despite the fact that the Supreme Court declared such covenants uncon-
stitutional in Shelly v. Kraemer in 1948.11 Redlining became rampant,
and "by the late 1950's many blacks were denied access to traditional
sources of housing finance by institutionalized procedures."'' °2 Through
the 1960's, government housing policies continued to perpetuate segrega-
tion, especially as suburban growth took off. Until 1962, federally-spon-
sored public housing works were classified for occupancy by race, and
even after that, city officials went to great lengths to keep housing
projects out of white neighborhoods.
Though measures such as the Fair Housing Act, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, the Community Reinvestment Act and the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act were enacted as responses to housing discrimination
and economic flight, they came too late for Brown. The incipient govern-
ment housing programs and policies "put a seal of approval on ethnic and
racial discrimination,"1 °3 and were eventually adopted non-governmental
actors. However, those adopting the government's racist practices took
those practices to another level, and to the suburbs. Banks, real estate
agents, mortgage brokers and appraisers would transform redlining into a
97. Id. at 626.
98. Id.
99. DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGA-
TION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51-52 (1993).
100. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 191-92 (1985).
101. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
102. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and
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science, carving up cities by race with a precision that would put heart
surgery to shame.
B. No Whites to Integrate: Suburbanization's Role in Undoing Brown
"We shall solve the city problem by leaving the city."
-Henry Ford °4
In the 1950's and 1960's, suburban population increased from 35 mil-
lion to 84 million. The so-called "urban crisis" accelerated this migration.
School desegregation, racial strife, crime, increasing social services costs
and taxes hastened the migration of white families to the suburbs. 1°5 By
1980, 100 million people lived in suburbs. 10 6 Henry Ford's words, in the
context of school desegregation efforts, proved prophetic.
As whites left the city, African-Americans continued to move into the
cities. During the post-World War II era and into the 1970's, the migra-
tion of poor, southern African-Americans to the north changed cities dra-
matically. Between 1960 and 1970 alone, central cities lost 1.92 million
whites, and gained 2.8 million African-Americans.107 As a result, for
those cities under desegregation orders, achieving the racial balance was
becoming impossible,10 8 in short, because there were no whites to
integrate. 10 9
With white flight came economic flight. In the post-segregation era,
suburbs enjoyed unprecedented industrial and commercial growth. Ac-
cording to a 1968 study, between 1954 and 1963, the United States' 40
largest cities lost nearly 26,000 manufacturing jobs, while suburbs gained
almost that exact amount."0 By 1980, suburban employment went from
14 million to 33 million jobs."' To be sure, many African-Americans
moving into the cities, "found no work, and instead, faced discrimination
and economic deprivation. "112
104. KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE
UNITED STATES 191-92 (1985).
105. Mark Baldassare, Suburban Communities, 18 ANN. R. Soc. 474, 477 (1992).
106. Id.
107. Yale Rabin, Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access, THE ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci., May 1973, at 65.
108. See SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 206-18 (2004).
109. DOUGLAS A. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 51-52 (1993).
110. Yale Rabin, Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access, THE ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. ScI., May 1973, at 66 (citing John F. Kain's study "The Distribution
and Movement of Jobs and Industry").
111. Mark Baldassare, Suburban Communities, 18 ANN. R. Soc. 474, 477 (1992).
112. Id. at 480.
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Public mass transportation policy exacerbated the economic plight of
inner-city African-Americans, who disproportionately lacked access to
suburbs and the emerging job opportunities.113 The distance to suburban
employment "imposed unreasonable costs burdens of centrally located
blacks, and [ ] public transit ... was badly oriented for traveling from the
ghetto to outlying centers of employment."" 4 However, it was in the
same year as Brown I that another transportation initiative was born
which would serve an underappreciated role in undermining desegrega-
tion efforts.
C. The Federal Highway System's Role in Keeping Schools Separate
and Unequal
"As often happens with interstate highways, the route selected was
through the poor area of town, not through the area where the politically
powerful people live."
-Justice William 0. Douglas1 15
The Federal Highway Transportation Act of 1956116 was first proposed
by President Eisenhower in 1954 and shepherded by Lucius Clay, then
Chairman of General Motors. Over the following three decades, con-
struction of federal highways would do more than just hasten the eco-
nomic demise of inner cities by facilitating white flight and economic
flight to the suburbs.' 17 Those highways also tore apart inner-city neigh-
113. Gilbert Paul Verbit, The Urban Transportation Problem, 142 U. PENN. L. REv.
368, 379, 380 (1975) ("[E]xisting transit facilities serve mainly suburban residential areas
and do not provide access to job sites in the suburbs") (noting the comparatively higher
growth rate of new jobs in the suburbs versus those in the inner city); see also Yale Rabin,
Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access, THE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc.
Sci., May 1973, at 68 (discussing how transportation policy and interstate construction
made it easier for access to the inner-city from the suburbs rather than access from the
inner-city to the suburbs).
114. Yale Rabin, Highways as a Barrier to Equal Access, THE ANNALS OF THE AM.
ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci., May 1973, at 68.
115. Triangle Improv. Council v. Ritchie, 402 U.S. 497, 502 (1971) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added) (pointing out how the interstate highway projects at issue dis-
proportionately affect the elderly and many low income households, already severely
displaced by other related public projects).
116. See generally The Federal Highway Transportation Act of 1956, 23 U.S.C.A.
§ 139 (2005) (replacing The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956). The Federal-Aid Highway
Act outlines the environmental review process for proposed projects and highlights the
Department of Transportation and state and local governments' obligations to provide the
public with an opportunity to participate in defining a project's purpose and need. Id.
117. Michael E. Lewyn, The Urban Crisis: Made in Washington, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 513,
538 (1996) (adding that new highways also drove retailers and businesses out of the city);
see also Daniel T. Lichter & Glenn V. Fuguitt, Demographic Response to Transportation
Innovation: The Case of the Interstate Highway, 59 Soc. FORCES 492, 509 (1980) (pointing
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borhoods, resulting in the destruction of millions of homes and countless
inner-city communities.1 18 In Kansas City, Missouri, for example, the
South Midtown Freeway, for which planning began in the 1960's, was
built through a section of the city that, in 1980, had over 122,000 African-
American residents.' 19 In Columbus, Ohio, the Interstate 670 spur was
built through a neighborhood that was between 50% and 90% African-
American. 1
20
In Nashville, Tennessee, Interstate 40 "swings suddenly in a wide loop,
avoiding the downtown area, but passing north through what was once
the center of Nashville's black community."' 1 That is because, in order
to build the interstate in 1971, twenty-seven apartments and 626 resi-
dences were leveled. Moreover, buildings used by 128 African-American
businesses, three community colleges, and one-third of north Nashville's
park facilities were destroyed. 122 Finally, at the dawn of the Interstate
age, and hard on the heels of the Brown decisions, Detroit's oldest estab-
lished African-American neighborhood, the historic Black Bottom, was
bulldozed to make way for Interstate 75.123
Furthermore, federal highways built through the poorest neighbor-
hoods lowered residential property values already artificially devalued by
racially discriminatory housing practices. Until recently, virtually every
state relied upon local property tax values and assessments to finance
public K-12 education. As urban districts became poorer on average, and
out that interstate highways not only promote economic growth and migration, but also
influence changes in trade and service areas). "Being located on an interstate highway is
positively related to employment growth in each of the three industrial employment classi-
fications [manufacturing, non-local services, and tourist related employment]. Id. at
504-05 t.3.
118. Michael E. Lewyn, Suburban Sprawl: Not Just an Environmental Issue, 84 MARQ.
L. REV. 301, 316 (2000) (listing numerous examples of African-American families' homes
and communities being destroyed).
119. Kevin Fox Gotham, Political Opportunity, Community Identity, and the Emer-
gence of a Local Anti-Expressway Movement, 46 Soc. PROBS. 332, 341 (1999).
120. Coal. of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110, 113-14
(S.D. Ohio 1984).
121. Note, In the Path of Progress: Federal Highway Relocation Assurances, 82 YALE
L.J. 373, 373 (1972).
122. Id. Apparently, an alternative to this route was rejected by the White business
community. Id. at 373 n.2.
123. DETROIT RIOTS - 1967, http://www.67riots.rutgers.edu/d-index.htm. The Black
Bottom was so named not because of those who lived there, but because of the soil. Id.
The history of residential segregation in Detroit is well-documented, and distressingly infa-
mous. Id. For example, during the 1940s and 1950s White Detroiters' sought to block the
entry of African-Americans into their neighborhoods by legal and extra-legal means, in
one instance building a six-foot high, one-foot wide concrete wall along Eight Mile Road,
to separate themselves from potential African-American neighbors. Id.
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experienced drops in residential property values as well as revenue from
businesses, inner-city school districts were receiving disproportionately
less monies per pupil.124 Consequently, public school financing would
suffer a crippling crisis. 125
Thus, the interstate highway system served a triple blow to Brown: 1) it
continued and reinforced residential segregation; 2) it enabled business
and industry to leave the inner-city; and 3) it caused a lower yield for
inner-city property tax assessments. But for the Supreme Court's rejec-
tion of Detroit's urban-suburban desegregation remedy, much of the
damage wrought by housing discrimination and highway construction
could have been mitigated. For whites, however, the "city problem" had
been solved-they left the city, insulated by suburban discriminatory
housing practices and Milliken from having to be under the edict of
school desegregation orders. 26 The most aching paradox is the fact that
Lucious Clay was the chief engineer of one tool (the highway), and heir
to another tool (the car)a2 7 that enabled the white flight from Detroit,
and necessitated the urban-suburban remedy in Milliken in the first
place. 128
V. AND ONE THOUSAND AND MORE: THE POWER OF SUBURBAN
INTERESTS AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION REFORM
"You don't have to live next to me-just give me my equality"
-Nina Simone, Mississippi Goddam129
It has long been clear that public schools would not achieve racial inte-
gration envisioned by Brown. The persistence of racism, the political and
judicial retreat, suburbanization, transportation policy, and the inability
to effectively combat the re-segregation of the inner cities have driven
124. Cf SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: How RACE AND CLASS
ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 267-68 (2004) (stating generally that high-
ways lower property values in relation to school funding).
125. Charles L. Nier, III, Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and
Legal Interpretation of Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
617, 627 (1999).
126. Although it cannot be said that Henry Ford meant his statement to be a refer-
ence to the racial ills of the city, it is nonetheless apropos.
127. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 174-76 (1985).
128. Id. From 1947 to 1963, Detroit lost 134,000 jobs. In ten years, from 1946 and
1956, General Motors spent $3.4 billion on new plants, Ford spent $2.5 billion, and
Chrysler spent $700 million. In that span, they opened twenty-five auto plants-all in De-
troit's suburbs.
129. NINA SIMONE, MISSISSIPPI GODDAM (Warner/Chappell Music, Phillips Records
1963).
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advocates of education reform for African-Americans to explore new so-
lutions. Public school finance reform, school vouchers, and "pupil
choice" plans are currently being tested and evaluated. However, three
facts about the current state of school finance reform do not bode well for
the legacy of Brown: 1) current reforms are being led by state legislatures;
2) those legislatures are controlled by suburban interests;130 and 3) subur-
ban constituents and legislators are, at best, ideologically opposed to en-
suring the most fundamental mandates of education reform as it regards
African-American public school students. 31 Consequently, as we see
happening today, those legislators most compelled to protect the interests
of inner city (and largely minority) students will be marginalized in legis-
lative outcomes.132
Voucher and school choice programs were once hailed as a solution to
not only enhancing the education opportunities for African-Americans,
but also as a means of achieving something that could not be done by
Brown and its progeny: meaningful racial integration. However, even
under these programs, suburban school districts have been successful in
staving off meaningful integration. 3 3 Since racial integration is not
achievable, initiatives now focus on ensuring adequate school funding.
Funding equalization has been the focus of several state class action
suits challenging public school financing methodologies-methodologies
which have had the effect of under-funding minority and/or poor school
districts. As a result of court orders, now legislatures in 45 states have
been directed to address these inequities. 134 However, by the very nature
of legislative institutions, political ideology, legislative party control, ma-
jority/minority ratios, and the inherent complexities of legislator roles
and approaches will impact school finance reform inputs and
outcomes. 35
130. Bryan Adamson, The Haint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Par-
adigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 181-82
(2006) (using Ohio as an example).
131. Id. at 184.
132. Id. at 193.
133. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111
YALE L.J. 2043, 2059 (2002) (referring to "the most remarkable feature of school finance
litigation is that even successful challenges have not led to equal funding, nor have any of
the suits done much to alter the basic structure of school finance schemes").
134. Bryan Adamson, The Haint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Par-
adigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 178
(2006).
135. Id. at 185-188. It has been well documented that Whites view school finance
reform through racial lenses. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School
Finance Reform, 98 MICH. L. REV. 432, 475 (1999); Douglas S. Reed, Twenty-Five Years
After Rodriguez: School Finance Litigation and the Impact of the New Judicial Federalism,
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What is more, legislative majorities in several states have trended to-
wards suburban interests, and consequently favors those most opposed to
school finance adequacy which would best benefit inner cities. The de-
bate over school finance adequacy, as a result, has at times taken on un-
settling racial subtext. 136 In response to court-ordered finance reform
mandates, legislators have decried the "activist judges" "imposing" their
will upon the people; the "trashing of the separation of powers ' 137 or
taking away "local control." '13 8 Suburban legislator and constituent resis-
tance to finance reform have been most vociferous in states in which class
actions were led by minority plaintiffs and school districts.139 The specific
objection lies in the raced perception that urban (read: minority) school
districts stand to benefit from school finance reform, with no apparent
benefit to suburban (read: white) school districts. 140 Consequently, the
rhetoric and resistance evokes disturbing reminders of post-Brown defi-
ance of integration orders.
Where suburban politicians direct legislative inputs, processes and out-
comes, solutions most effective in addressing the needs of minorities in
public education funding are likely to be elusive.' 4 1 Those in control
most strongly opposed to meaningful reform which is court-directed, de-
mands taxation as a means to provide more financial resources, threatens
local control, or results that solely or disproportionately benefit inner-city
school districts.' 42 True reform will require a legislative collective that is
ideologically, socially, morally, and fiscally committed to remedying the
problem. Unfortunately, once again, we hear little about moral impera-
tive to remedy the unforgivable racial disparities in public education sys-
tems, only of solutions which are palatable to majoritarian interests.
32 L. & Soc'y REV. 175, 211 (1998). It is also well documented that, in the last 10 years,
state legislatures have been dominated by the rise in suburban legislators, as citizens move
out of the cities. As the ideological and racial make-up of legislators closely follow their
constituents, policy inputs and outcomes on school finance reform will reflect the predomi-
nating suburban interests. See Bryan Adamson, The Haint in the (School) House: The
Interest Convergence Paradigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL.
W. L. REV. 173, 201 (2006).
136. Bryan Adamson, The Haint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Par-
adigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REv. 173, 179 (2006)
(discussing Ohio as an example).
137. Id. at 182.
138. Id. at 193-94.
139. Id. at 186-88.
140. Id.
141. Bryan Adamson, The Haint in the (School) House: The Interest Convergence Par-
adigm in State Legislatures and School Finance Reform, 43 CAL. W. L. REV. 173, 201
(2006).
142. Id. at 184.
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VI. CONCLUSION
"Even the smallest victory is never to be taken for granted. Each victory
must be applauded, because it is so easy not to battle at all, to just ac-
cept and call that acceptance inevitable."
-Audre Lorde
No measure of a court's equitable power, no measure of a govern-
ment's dismantling of de jure barriers, no number of buses could solve
what James Baldwin and others have seen as our nation's core moral fail-
ing: racism. Brown set the stage for dismantling racism, segregation, and
discrimination in public school systems. However, addressing the racism,
segregation, and discrimination in politics, suburbanization, housing, and
transportation policy went unabated for too long, and frustrated the abil-
ity of Brown's edict to be wholly fulfilled.
Though we recently commemorated the fiftieth anniversary Brown, re-
flection is still warranted. For many, that reflection invites a profound
sense of disappointment in light of the promise Brown signaled for Afri-
can-Americans, educational achievement, and racial integration. How-
ever, as the history of Brown makes painfully clear, courts "cannot
produce social reform on its own, and [ ] judges are unlikely to challenge
established social consensus."' 4 3 Given that the issue of educational
achievement for African-Americans has shifted to the statehouses across
the country, the same can be said of legislators.
Today, with the benefit of hindsight, we can all reflect upon the Brown
decisions and implementations with an arched eyebrow of skepticism. To
the extent that skepticism has transformed itself into disappointment, it is
worth considering that perhaps, just perhaps, our expectation for what
Brown could achieve for African-Americans was outsized, or at least,
misplaced. What we hoped for was not necessarily what Brown promised.
While Brown set us "on the path of rejecting the kind of racial exclusion
that had made African Americans a people apart since before the na-
tion's founding,"' 44 Brown could not break through that smothering pat-
tern of a thousand humiliations beyond courts' reach.
143. Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Fabled
Desegregation Case, Not Everyone Is Celebrating, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102.
144. ROBERT J. COTTROL, RAYMOND T. DIAMOND & LELAND B. WARE, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDucATIO. Caste, Culture, and the Constitution 241 (2003).
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